hie concludes that a great many positive results have emerged from the Special Rural Development Programme, but the results have frequently been disappointing. The shortcomings of the Programme stem from the fact that it was not given the best chance to succeed in the first place and reveal the great difficulty of making headway in the promotion of social and economic change. This accentuates the heed for pre-testing and closely monitoring rural development programmes, along the lines envisaged in the S.R.D.P. : is stated that S.R.D.P, "... is an experimental programme, .that it is intended to provide experience in conception, design and execution of comprehensive rural development". In respect of replication, it stated that "one of the fundamental principles of the whole programme is that projects and methods that are proved successful in the pilot areas can be reproduced in other similar areas subsequently".
Finally, on using existing resources, it said that it would be a fundamental principle"to utilise existing resources of staff and finance as far as.possible, and to seek external assistance to support what will, in effect, be a large-scale self-help effort
In other words, it was to be a Kenyan show.
What came to be an important, and perhaps unusual, feature, however was' the extent of University staff participation, via the Institute for Development Studies, in a major government development programme. It was from a government-sanctioned I.D.S. study that the original S.R.D.P, areas .. Nairobi, 1972 , and The Second Overall Evaluation"of the Special Rural Development Programme, Occasional J?aper Ng.. 12., 19.75, The present writer wrote or co-authored five of the nineteen substantive chapters of thn sccond report and participated in its .1.overall organisation of research and preparation. This paper draws on this collaborative report but responsibility for the presentation here rests with the author.
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This article draws heavily on the collaborative work done in the course of this evaluation, but formulates the writer's own conclusions regarding the experience under the S.R.D.P, THE CONTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE S.R.D.P.
As stated above, the essential aim of S.R.D.P, was experimental,.
to try out experimental projects or methods in particular areas with a view to possible replication in other parts of Kenya. This is why a cross-section of types of areas was selected and why the areas.chosen were relatively small ones, below the size of a District, In addition, it was of course hoped that successful projects would increase incomes and employment in the areas concerned, Experimentation was to be involved not only in the projects established but in the system of development administration itself, which had a number of new features. Finally, it was hoped that it would be possible in this new system to encourage local involvement in the development process, which represents another experimental aspect.
The main administrative features of the S.R.D.P, have been:
(1) The geographical size of the unit selected, generally consisting of one or two Divisions within a District;
(2) The appoinment of an Area Coordinator out side of"the''usual administrative machinery. The area Coordinator was of District Officer level and appointed from the Office of the President, although later reporting to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, His task was the coordination of the efforts of departmental officers in the area into an area development planning exercise. The Area Coordinator was only to be; conccmnd with development projects rather than general administrative duties or law enforcement, for which the District Commissioner's office, with a designated District Officer, would continue to be responsible. The Area-Coordinator works with a "Project Committee which meets three times a year to initiate and check on the progress of projects. In addition to departmental officers representing the various ministries at the local level, membership of the committees includes the local M.P., three other local leaders and a representative of local voluntary agencies, so that one would look to the Project Committee for ensuring coordination of policies and other forms of cooperation among departments and for involvement of the local community in the development process;
. ,. Similarly with the introduction of sheep into Lelan, though here there-are some differences in the'credit and'supervisory aspects 6f : the project's-. 'The essential criterion is that there is some element in the-projedt itself or the way in which it is carried out which might be replicated "in"other.areas, rather than simply the exploitation of a resource limited to one area. This is'not to say, of course,. that the. introduction ..of new-activities of any sort into an area is not important. '
The list -'of active projects which were deemed experimental by the team is given in Table 1 •. return on investment.
4
The family planning-programme in Vihiga, Kakarfiega District, was of great potential national importance in-a country where the population; growth rate, approaching four-per cent, is one of the highest in the world. The special-.element in the Vihiga programme was' an intensification of family - In addition, the I.D.S, evaluators found serious weaknesses in the curriculum"and teaching methods employed. Their recommendations are likely to yield considerable improvements in the programme in future.
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Tm
The willingness of the Ministry of Finance and Planning to accept such poor definitions when allocating funds may also be indicative of weakness in project formulation at the central level.
Within the project lists, also, we find a variety of'items which fall outside the narrow definition of.development projects. We find some in its various aspects. We consider here briefly the success of the system and the lessons to be derived from it, specifically the elements which might be replicated.
We might note first that as a prototype experimental model.of a' development administration system which might be extended'to other parts Having said that, it can be.said that the innovation of having a senior officer,, the Area Coordinator, charged solely with a coordinating development function has been a distinct success, although not equally so in all areas. The most important determinant seems to have been the quality and drive of the appointee, though in some areas turnover in the holding'of the office affected progress. Also important was the degree of cooperation secured by the Area Coordinator from the local bureaucracy, which was variable in its attitudes, A fundamental weakness in the /Area Coordinator's position, in relation to both programme preparation and attempts at coordination, is that he has had, for the most part, no funds in his control, another factor which must surely change in a system of district development planning.
Turning to the Programming and Implementation Management System, this seems to have been valuable and, though complex, was generally found workable by officers in the field. One.Area Coordinator judged PIM to be "perhaps the best thing associated with S.R.D.P.", though its effectiveness seems to have depended very much on the ability and authority of the Area Coordinator using it. The value of the new system is difficult to assess because the conventional reporting of projects is so inadequate as a source of information or basis for action and this fact is not generally realised. Certainly one is struck with the apparent timelessness with which certain major projects are promoted and the failure to secure certain basic information at the tight' time:
for example, a major ranching project in Kwale has been under discussion by Government for seven years now, and only after six years.was it found that the proposed ranching area was badly affected by tse-tse fly, The poor quality of project preparation and the difficulties in finding good projects revealed above only underlines the need for a management system. What needs to be -14 -IDS/WP 259 appreciated, of course;, is that the system cannot itself produce good projects.
It is not a system'of project evaluation or selection, .but merely a device for " checking the timing and implementation of .projects and revealing-r~ deficiencies and problems as they arise. In fact it generally failed tobreak down the strong inclination to assume or report that "all is going well" with a project and the reluctance to pronounce failure.. And as already discussed the system failed to produce a radical improvement In the description of projects.
The Field Staff Management System (F.S.M.S,) tried out in-Mbere was abandoned at the end of 1973 after the expatriates involved in devising the system had left. This was probably a pity. Certainly it .had proved time-^ consuming, and not all the information produced was useful. But there was, an increase in information, more direction and purpose was afforded to the work of agricultural assistants, and in many cases a greater -commitment Kapenguria was to develop trade and exchange between a.mere commercialised lowland"area, based on livestock, and the highland area, producing crops.
In Kwale asequential master plan' exists, though this lacks content at the moment, and constitutes no more than a proposal.
The aim of.integrated development is implied in some statements-of Q S.R.D.P, objectives. Thus Leach reports that the objectives of the Programme were, officially described, as-.
The primary objective is to increase rural incomes and employment opportunities. The secondary objective is to establish procedures and techniques for accelerated and self-generating rural development which can be repeated in other similar areas and, in particular, to improve the development capacity of Kenya Government officials in the field.
The first objective of increasing incomes and employment significantly in an area requires a substantial programme of integrated development. But this is to an important extent competitive with the second objective. And it could be argued that the S.R.D.P, fell between the two stools of experimentation and innovation on the one. hand, and integrated area development on the other. For, while the available finance was hardly sufficient to support integrated programmes in these areas in order to produce a significant development impact, the absorption of a considerable proportion of funds into non-experimental projects and into the normal on-going activity of the various ministries operating locally reduced the. amount available for genuinely experimental or innovative projects. S.R.D.P, accounted for only about twelve to fourteen percent of district development expenditures, 7 according to one estimate, showing very clearly that the funds available were far short of what would have been required for an intensified, integrated rural development effort,..An intensified district development effort, might be expected "to""increase development spending by fifty or one hundred per cent.
5,.
See the section by C. Barnes in the 1972 S.R.D.P. evaluation report. This idea was highly'optimistic about the rate of increased commercialisation in the lowland areas.
S.
Leach, p. 359. 
S.R.D.P. AS A MEDJUM FOR OVERSEAS FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
There was considerable lack of enthusiasm.in the central ministries for the proposed S.R.D.P. wheruit-was .being, set up., and this has been the Q case to some extent ever since. One of the main reasons for the decision to PYr*sue the Programme was undoubtedly that it seemed a useful device for-8. See Leach.
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.district question arises, therefore, whether the establishment of regional or /development programmes along S.R.D.P. lines is a good medium for increasing the inflow of foreign financial aid and for widening the purposen for which aid is available. Apart from the value of the programme itself, the jnumber of reports prepared in the Vihiga area (by American expatriate officers and researchers) and In, for example, the Rural Industrial Development Programme (by Scandinavians) suggests that technical, assistance is at least effective in monitoring programmes, measuring results and preparing reports.
It is doubtful, therefore, whether any general conclusion may be drawn from the 8«RoD = P 0 experience regarding the usefulness or otherwise of advisers or technical assistance• dn general, so long as these operate as they should in a supplementing r,ple rather than as a substitute for local Kenya-organised activity., Relative success or failure has tended to depend on. the quality and enthusiasm of the personnel involved, whether Kenyan or Finally, what should be observed from the high casualty rate among projects and the generally variable results is the sheer difficulty of making headway in the promotion of social and economic change. This accentuates the need for pre-testing programmes before adoption on-a national basis and for close monitoring subsequently along S.R.D.P, lines.
